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Over the past twenty-five years, the security threat 
posed by terrorism has increased dramatically. In just the 
past fifteen years Americans have witnessed the U.S. 
hostages in Iran, the bombing of the American troops in 
Lebanon, the seizure of numerous hostages in Lebanon, the 
Achille Lauro incident, the bombing of the Trans World 
Airlines (TWA) flight over Scotland, numerous Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) attacks, and other terrorist events 
too numerous to mention. 
These events raise several key questions. Why did 
terrorism increase as it did? Can national and 
international security measures decrease the threat of 
terrorism? Who are the targets of terrorism and why? 
Purpose of the Study 
Many scholars have written and researched such 
questions. Some of their findings are based on the 
assumption that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism 
than other types of systems. In other words, many assume 
that some system qualities lend themselves to terrorist 
activity. If this is the case, then methods to combat 
terrorism must be developed with that in mind. If open 
systems are most vulnerable, then methods must be developed 
to reduce the vulnerability while preserving the basic 
openness of the system. 
2 
The relationship between the system and terrorism 
has never been quantitatively examined. This paper will 
attempt to do that. Specifically, the purpose of this paper 
is a quantitative study of the system and its relationship 
to terrorism. This will be accomplished by first 
establishing definitions of basic terminology, then 
examining the relevance of the issue in the literature, next 
defining a systematic procedure for researching the 
questions raised by the literature, and finally, concluding 
with the results and analysis. 
If this study reveals that open systems are more 
vulnerable to terrorism this would not be earth-shattering 
news. However, quantitative studies when and where possible 
are important. Face validity and assumptions, even if based 
on sound reasoning, are not sufficient when a quantitative 
study is possible. 
In addition, if this study reveals that unstable or 
weak systems are more vulnerable to the political affects of 
terrorism than are stable or strong systems, regardless of 
system type, this will have implications for security 
studies. If weak systems are more vulnerable to the effect 
of terrorism, then international security arrangements to 
combat terrorism must include such systems and must be 
developed with them in mind. If weak open systems are most 
vulnerable, this has particular relevance in the ever 
changing post-Cold War era where newly opened systems are 
already struggling with a myriad of security issues. 
The potential implications demonstrate the 
importance and relevance of this research. A quantitative 
study of this nature is missing in the literature on 
terrorism. Such a study would, without a doubt, contribute 
to future research in the field. 
3 
This research will begin by first defining and 
identifying key components, second presenting the method of 
research, third, presenting the results of the research, and 
finally, fourth, developing conclusions from the research. 
Chapter One begins this process by defining and identifying 
political systems. Chapter Two continues this process by 
defining and identifying terrorism. Chapter Three 
identifies the links between political systems and terrorism 
and begins development of the research hypothesis. Chapter 
Four moves to the second part of this research by 
operationalizing the concepts and presenting the research 
hypotheses. Chapter Five takes the reader to the third step 
by presenting results and analysis. Finally, Chapter Six 
draws conclusions from the research. 
Defining Basic Terminology 
The focus of this paper then will be to analyze the 
relationship between the political system and terrorism. To 
do so, a basic understanding of terminology is required. 
4 
Before proceeding with the study, the meaning of such terms 
as "political system", "open system", "closed system", "weak 
system", and "strong system" will be defined. 
What is a "Political System"? 
The term "political system" gained prominence in 
political science during the late 1950s and 1960s. The 
term, however, as Spiro notes, can be traced back to Thomas 
Hobbes in his Leviathan. 1 During the 1950's and 1960's, 
the height of the behavioral revolution in political 
science, the term "political system" replaced the term 
"state". 
The behavioral revolution was, among other things, a 
reaction against the institutional approach to political 
science. The institutional approach focused on the legal 
institutions. For example, a state could be defined as a 
democracy based on the existence of an elected legislative 
body. Clearly, this was not a satisfactory approach. 
The term "political system" emerged during the behavioral 
revolution as scholars such as Easton and Almond sought to 
replace the term "state", a term tied to the institutional 
approach, with a term giving a wider understanding of the 
phenomena of politics. 2 
1Herbert T. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," 
in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth 
(New York: The Free Press, 1967), 164. 
2David Easton, The Political System (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953); Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, 
5 
In addition to rejecting the term "state" because of 
its tie to institutionalism, the behavioralists found the 
term to be too ambiguous. In his discussion of this, Easton 
cites a 1931 article that found 145 definitions of the term 
"state" . 3 
Finally, the behavioralists rejected the "state" 
concept because it was too narrow. The term suggests legal 
institutions or institutions which are legally founded. 4 
Further, the term has been frequently limited by applying 
the concept of governance of territory to it. 5 Such 
limitations fail to address pre-state societies or societies 
that do not fit such a "legal" model. 
Having examined the behavioralists rejection of the 
concept of "state", the "political system" concept can now 
be examined. An overview of three definitional variations 
will provide the basis for developing the definition 
utilized in this research. 
Almond defines the political system based on 
functions. According to this approach, all political 
eds, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1960) . 
3c. H. Titus, "A Nomenclature in Poli ti cal Science, " 
American Political Science Review 25 (1931): 45-60; as cited 
in Easton. 
4oran R. Young, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Systems of Political Science 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 2-3. 
5c. C. Rodee, T. J. Anderston, and C. 





systems perform similar functions and have political 
structures. 6 Almond defines the term "political system" as 
"the legitimate, order-maintaining or transforming system in 
society. 117 
In Kaplan's definition of the political system, the 
system factor is emphasized more. He defines the political 
system as a subsystem that acts "as the ultrastable 
regulator of the larger system in which it functions. 118 
Like Almond, Kaplan emphasizes the order-maintenance role of 
the political system. 
Spiro takes a much broader view of the political 
system. For him, "political systems can exist wherever the 
people are concerned about common problems and are engaged 
in cooperation in their solution. 119 What is common to all 
of these definitions is a focus on the observable behavior 
and activities of the political system as a whole. 
A political system can then be defined both by what 
it is and by what it is not. A political system is not what 
is commonly thought of as government. It is not simply 
institutions, such as the House of Representatives. The 
political system encompasses the political society in a much 
6Almond and Coleman, 10-11. 
7Ibid, 7. 
8Morton A. Kaplan, "Systems Theory, " in Contemporary 
Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The 
Free Press, 1967), 161. 
9spiro, 1 72. 
7 
broader sense. A political system is, however, the process 
of politics. The political system focuses on the observable 
political behavior of the society as a whole. 10 
The term political system is used in this research 
for two reasons. First, the nature of the research requires 
such a term. This research will attempt to examine factors 
that exist on a broad scale across a society. It will 
attempt to examine the system level components that 
contribute to vulnerability to terrorism, not merely a 
system's institutions. Second, on a more practical level, 
the term "political system" has become generally accepted 
among scholars and as such employing such a term brings to 
mind a generally understood concept. 
How are Political Systems Distinguished? 
Having defined in general "political systems'', it is 
important to define the specific types of systems. Over the 
years scholars have come to identify two types of system 
that can generally be referred to as "open systems" and 
11 closed systems 11 • 11 A brief overview of the literature on 
system typologies along the open-closed dimension will 
provide the basis for developing a solid definition. 
10David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. x. 
11 This, of course, is only one dimension of system 
type. Other dimensions exist, such as the traditional v. 
modern dimension, but these will not be analyzed in this 
particular research. 
8 
The definitions of the term "open system" fall under 
a variety of names. For example, Rummel uses the term 
"libertarianism", Small and Singer use the term "bourgeois 
democracies", Chan uses "political freedom", Dahl uses 
"polyarchy", and both Bollen and Gastil use "liberal 
democracy", to name a few. 12 Despite the diversity of 
terms, these various definitions share some common features 
as follows (see figure 1) : political participation and/or 
elections, competition, freedom, and limited government. 
Political participation and/or elections is the most 
common feature among the six scholars examined here. Though 
they all include some concept of participation, their 
concepts differ substantially. The divisions between these 
scholars can roughly be classified in three ways. First, 
some scholars emphasize the existence of elections. For 
example, for Rummel, political participation is defined in 
terms of the existence of free elections for the top 
12R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International 
Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 1 (1983): 
27-71; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are the 
Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 
28, no. 4 (1984): 617-48; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: 
Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1971) ;Kenneth Bollen, "Liberal De~ocracy --
Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures," 
American Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1993): 1207-
30; Raymond D. Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom." Freedom 
at Issue 17 (1973): 2-23; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, 
"The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," The 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4 (Summer 
1976) : 50-69. 
Freedom/ 
Participation/ Political Individual Limited 
Elections Competition Rights Government 
"Libertarianism" x x x 
Rummell 
"Bourgeois Democracy" x x x 
Small and Singer 




"Liberal Democracy" x x 
Bollen 
"Liberal Democracy" x x x x 
Gastil 
Figure 1. Elements of System Type used in various 
definitions. 
political leaders. 13 For Small and Singer, a "bourgeois 
democracy" holds periodic elections. 14 Similarly, 
political participation for Chan is evidenced by an elected 
executive and lower legislature. 15 
Second, some scholars emphasize the right to 
participate. For Dahl such a right is key to defining the 
system type. 16 Bollen also sees the freedom to form and 
participate in political groups as a critical feature. 17 
9 
13Rummell, "Libertarianism and International Violence," 
1208. 
14small and Singer, 54. 
15Chan, 630. 
16Dahl, 6 7 - 9 0 . 
17Bollen, 1208. 
However, the legal right to participate does not mean that 
individuals can actually participate in a meaningful way. 
As Huntington notes, popular participation does not equal 
popular control. 18 
Third, some scholars emphasize that participation 
and elections cannot be examined separately. They are 
10 
elements which must be taken together. Gastil contends that 
elections should be examined in terms of the number of 
regional and local level elections. Further, for Gastil, 
participation goes beyond the right to participate or the 
percentage that participate (though he certainly considers 
these factors) to also include what exclusions exist in the 
system, both institutionally and behaviorally. Of the three 
approaches, this appears to be the most holistic. 
Competition within the political system is viewed by 
four of the scholars as a key element with which to 
distinguish among political systems. Here again, while the 
authors agree on the component, the specific meaning of 
competition differs. For Rummel, competition is analyzed at 
the party level. How much competition is there among 
parties? 19 Similarly, Small and Singer look for the 
18samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 
89. 
19R. J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence 
Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 
2 8, no. 3 ( 19 8 5) : 4 2 6 . 
11 
existence of opposition parties. 20 In both cases the focus 
is on two-party or multi-party systems. 
Chan looks at the competition element differently. 
He focuses on competitive nominations and the permissibility 
of political opposition. Political opposition does not 
necessarily exist, it is merely permissible. 21 
Gastil takes a different approach. While he does 
focus on the number of political parties that a system 
contains, this is not the crucial point in determining 
openness. He specifically addresses this issue contending 
"the existence or non-existence of multiple parties is 
evidence of democracy, but it is not absolutely 
conclusive."~ He thus leaves open the possibility that 
his "liberal democracy" can exist in a single-party system. 
Freedom or individual rights is a third component 
found in system type classifications. Among those who use 
this component to distinguish systems some agreement exists 
as to the criteria. All three include a criteria for 
freedom of expression, though to varying degrees. Rummel 
and Gastil take the broadest approach as both add the 
~Small and Singer, 54. 
21 chan, 630. 
22Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of 
Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions, " in On Measurinq 
Democracy, ed. Alex Inkeles (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction 
Publishers, 1991), 29. 
12 
component of individual rights. 23 They view the ability of 
the individual to exercise rights as a key element. 
A fourth component, limited government, is included 
by three scholars in their criteria for distinguishing 
between systems. Small and Singer require a parliament with 
either parity or control over the executive in defining a 
"bourgeois democracy". 24 Much like the institutional 
approach, this is based on the structure of the system more 
so than on the behavior of the system. Similarly, Chan 
emphasizes the need for a legislature with the power to 
check the executive. 25 For Gastil, the concept of limited 
government takes a different shape in what he calls a 
"defined sphere of government."u As with his other 
components, Gastil takes a very broad approach, less 
institutionally based than any of the other approaches. 
Thus, six different scholars provide six different 
means by which to define the openness of a system. Of the 
definitions offered, Gastil's is the only one which takes 
into account all four factors. Further, Gastil's definition 
focuses less on the institutions and more on the actual 
23Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence"; 
Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," 3. 
~Small and Singer, 54. 
25Chan, 630. 
UGastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," 20. 
behavior. 27 His definition then fits well with the 
definition of political system presented earlier. 
The term "closed system" in contrast refers to 
systems that lack the qualities of open systems. Closed 
13 
systems limit participation and restrict competition. 
Freedom of expression and individual rights are suppressed 
within such systems. Further, they do not demonstrate 
"limited government". Generally, the legislative body, if 
such exists, is the weakest element of the political system 
with little or no control over the executive body. Closed 
systems, then, fail to exhibit the key characteristics of 
open systems in their behavior. 
Throughout this paper, the terms "open system" and 
"closed system" will be employed, rather than any of the 
alternatives offered by the scholars above. These terms 
will be used for two reasons. First, the term "openness" 
does not carry with it the ideological baggage that 
"democracy" does. Further, as will shortly be demonstrated, 
much of the research that contends that system type is 
related to terrorism does so based on the openness of such 
systems in terms of their access to targets and the freedom 
of movement both into the system and within the system. 
Overall the term "openness" is broader than the term 
"democracy", carrying the connotation of involving more than 
merely the institutions of the system; for it includes in 
27Gastil, "Experiences and Suggestions," 22. 
14 
it a connotation of the whole system. 
In addition to classifying systems as open or 
closed, systems can further be classified as weak or strong. 
The weak political system is constantly struggling to 
maintain control. If elections do occur, the results are 
frequently challenged, tainted by fraud, or controlled. 
Because of the untenable position of the governments in weak 
systems, individual rights may be suppressed. Such systems 
are neither entirely limited nor completely authoritarian. 
Various parts of the government struggle to maintain control 
of other parts. A precarious balancing act characterizes 
weak political systems, regardless of whether they are open 
or closed, as they struggle to achieve or maintain their 
legitimacy. 
In contrast, strong systems have achieved 
legitimacy, either by force or by consent. Regardless of 
whether they are open or closed, the system itself is rarely 
challenged directly. In a nutshell, strong political 
systems maintain legitimacy and order. 
Summary 
This research proposes to examine the relationship 
between the political system (both its openness and its 
strength) and terrorism. It will examine what elements of 
the political system increase its vulnerability to 
terrorism. The examination will involve more than merely 
looking at the institutional structures. In distinguishing 
15 
between system types, the research will focus on the actual 
behavior of the system. Having defined what a political 
system is and how systems are distinguished, the terms 
relating to terrorism must clearly be defined. This will be 
the focus of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER TWO 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING 
Terrorist scholars have devoted a great deal of time 
and writings to defining transnational terrorism. They have 
tried to answer such questions as: What makes an act a 
terrorist act as opposed to a revolutionary or criminal act? 
What distinguishes a group as a terrorist group? From the 
past research and debate, a definition of terrorism based on 
the group's objective and the group's method emerges. 
Defining Terrorism 
The terrorist group strives to induce political 
change. Rowe describes the objective of the terrorist as: 
. a form of coercion 
the control or responses 
governments, vested with 
policy issues. 1 
to induce change in 
of organizations, bodies or 
the power to determine 
His definition is directed at the association that the 
terrorist group is attempting to influence. By emphasizing 
the power and policy making aspects of the organizations 
targeted by terrorism, Rowe's definition emphasizes the 
political nature of the terrorist's target. Further, 
1Dennis Rowe, Considered Responses to Contemporary 
Terrorism in Democratic Societies (Chicago, IL: Office of 
International Criminal Justice, The University of Illinois 
at Chicago, 1988), 2. 
16 
17 
terrorists want recognition in a political light, not a 
criminal light. Netanyahu notes that terrorists in jail 
want the same status of prisoners of war. 2 They themselves 
recognize and articulate political objectives. 
A criminal group may seek power and may employ similar 
tactics as a terrorist group. Both criminals and terrorists 
take hostages; however, the criminal's ultimate objective 
and the terrorist's ultimate objective differ substantially. 
The terrorist ultimately seeks political change. 
The political objective may be based on ideology in 
the sense that the terrorist may justify his actions based 
on his perception of an ideology. Much debate exists about 
this aspect of terrorism. One side of the debate sees 
ideology as an important factor of terrorism. For example, 
Cline and Alexander view left-wing ideologies as the fuel 
for terrorism. 3 Similarly, Netanyahu claims, 
"Totalitarianism is the major ideological source of modern 
terrorism. 114 
The other side of the ideology debate views terrorism 
as essentially non-ideological. Becker contends that 
2Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West 
Can Win (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986), 
11. 
3Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The 
Soviet Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1984). 
4Netanyahu, 39. 
terrorism is "a method ... not an ideology. 115 Ideology, 
according to Crenshaw is functional to the terrorist. 
Ideology is "used to escape a disconcerting reality rather 
than to guide actions. 116 Indeed, evidence exists to 
support the argument that terrorist groups lack systematic 
belief structures. 7 Others see terrorists as primarily 
anti-statists who are more idealistic than ideological. 
Terrorists are, as a whole, idealists who seek to serve a 
18 
higher cause. 8 While terrorist groups are distinguished by 
their political objective, they are not necessarily 
ideological groups. 
Not only does the objective defines terrorists, their 
method also defines them. Terrorist acts are not random 
(although they often appear to be). Rather, terrorist acts 
are calculated, deliberate, and systematic acts. 9 
Terrorist attacks are "premeditated", as Enders and Sandler 
note. 10 
5Jillian Becker, "The Most Important Question," 
Terrorism: An International Journal 4, no. 1-4 (1980) 316. 
6Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism and International 
Cooperation (New York: Institute for East-West Security 
Studies, 1989), 16. 
7Ibid. 
8Frederick Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies: 
Terror and Terrorism in Our Times (New York: Norton, 1976), 
8 . 
9see Netanyahu. 
10walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness 
of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-
19 
Not only are terrorists systematic in their method, 
their method focuses on innocent victims. As Enders and 
Sandler note, terrorists "often direct their violence ... at a 
large target group, not immediately involved in the 
political decision-making process that they intend to 
influence." 11 Frequently, terrorists victimize third 
parties and innocent civilians. 12 Although the victims are 
usually innocent civilians, they are not random victims. 
Rather, terrorists chose their victims based on their 
prominence and their value to their country. 13 
Terrorists use innocent victims to achieve their 
intermediary objective of fear. Terrorists methodically use 
fear to achieve their ultimate political objectives. They 
design their method of choosing innocent victims in acts 
that appear random "to create an atmosphere of fear. " 14 
Through fear they strive to change the public's 
attitudes. 15 The terrorist does not seek to physically 
defeat his enemy; rather, "the terrorist seeks to 
Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review 
8 7 , no . 4 ( 19 9 3 ) : 8 2 9 . 
11 Ibid., 829. 
12see Netanyahu. 
13Hacker, 1 O . 
14George P. Shultz, "The Challenge to Democracies" 
in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu 
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986), 17. 
15Hacker, 3 . 
20 
demonstrate that his opponents are powerless to protect. 1116 
To accomplish this, he only needs to diminish the 
oppositions' "authority and morale. 1117 Terrorists 
manipulate the public's fear using it as an impetus for 
political change. 
In summary, terrorism is the systematic, premeditated 
threat or use of violence directed at non-military targets 
to inspire fear and through fear to ultimately achieve 
political changes. Terrorists are distinguishable from 
common criminals by their objectives and methods. 
Identifying Terrorism 
Terrorism is a form of political violence, but it is 
not the only form of violence used to promote political 
change. Other types of political violence short of war also 
exist. How then is terrorism distinct from other forms of 
political violence such as guerrilla movements and state 
terror? The victims targeted and the perpetrators involved 
make terrorism distinct from other forms of political 
violence. 
Some scholars have lumped guerrilla movements and 
terrorists together. For example, Halperin identifies 
revolutionary and guerrilla movements in Latin America with 
16Ernst Halperin, Terrorism in Latin America, The 
Washington Papers, vol. iv, no. 33 (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1976), 7. 
17Ibid. 
21 
terrorism. 18 Other scholars struggle with classify such 
groups as the IRA and Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) . Are they revolutionary movements or terrorist 
organizations? 
Guerrillas and revolutionaries are not the same as 
terrorists. A simple distinguishing characteristic can be 
made. Guerrillas and revolutionaries primarily wage war on 
military forces. They attack other combatants, not 
civilians. Terrorists are distinct from guerrillas based on 
their victims. 
McFarlane shows this distinction in his description of 
the terrorist attack: 
The Nation is not in any immediate sense threatened. 
Attacks are short; they do not occur on a battlefield or 
in enemy territory; they are likely instead to occur in 
a city street of a friendly country. The adversary 
usually remains hidden and undeclared until after the 
attack. 19 
Simply put, terrorists violate the rules of just war by 
attacking illegitimate targets. 20 
18see Halperin. 
19Robert C. McFarlane, "Foreward, " in Fighting Back: 
Winning the War Against Terrorism, eds. Neil Livingstone and 
Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 
1986) . 
~For an overview of "just war" see Michael Walzer, 
Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977). For a 
counter position on the legitimate use of political violence 
see David Miller, "The Use and Abuse of Political Violence," 
Political Studies (Great Britain) 32, no. 3 (1984), 401-19. 
22 
State Terror, State Terrorism and Terrorism 
As terrorism and guerrilla warfare are distinct forms 
of political violence, state terror and terrorism are also 
distinct acts. State terror and terrorism are distinct 
based on the perpetrator. State terror is the use of 
political violence from above, whereas terrorism is an 
"attempt by the powerless to exert control. 1121 They both 
believe that the use of fear will aid them in accomplishing 
political objectives. States, however, most often use fear 
to prevent change while terrorists use fear to promote 
change. 
Further, state terror and state-sponsored terrorism 
are not the same. State terror involves political leaders 
"acting within or under the color of the law. 1122 State-
sponsored terrorism is a subset of state terror whereby 
states use terrorist groups to promote their political 
objectives either internally or externally. State-sponsored 
terrorism is often difficult to identify due to the lack of 
clear linkage between the state and the terrorist group's 
actions. State terror, state terrorism, and terrorism are 
21 John M. Gleason, "Third World Terrorism: 
Perspectives for Quantitative Research," in Behavioral and 
Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, eds. Yonah Alexander 
and John M. Gleason (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 243; 




22samuel Hendel, "The Price of Terrorism in the 
in International Terrorism in the Contemporary 
ed. Marius H. Livingston (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
1978), 122. 
23 
similar in their use of force and fear, but they are 
different forms of political violence. Terrorism is a 
distinct form of political violence. 
Defining Transnational Terrorism 
While terrorism is a distinct form of political 
violence, various types of terrorism exist. Roughly 
speaking, terrorism can be distinguished between 
transnational or international terrorism and internal or 
national terrorism. This research will focus on 
transnational terrorism because, as will be demonstrated 
later, this type of terrorism is viewed as a threat to both 
closed and open systems. 
Transnational terrorism encompasses the definition of 
terrorism with further specificity. Terrorism is defined as 
"transnational" when it involves "participants, property, or 
territory from two or more nations."~ Wilkinson uses the 
term "international terrorism". He defines it as an attack 
against the citizens and property of another state or 
internal terrorists acting against foreign citizens or 
property in their country.~ "International terrorism" is 
that terrorist activity directed at foreigners. 
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An illustration will demonstrate the difference 
between these definitions. A car bomb planted by an Iraqi 
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terrorist kills an Iraqi citizen in Jordan. Such an attack 
is considered a transnational attack because it occurs on 
Jordanian territory. It is not, however, considered an 
international attack because it involves two Iraqi citizens. 
International terrorism, as defined by Wilkinson, 
misses a crucial aspect of terrorist actions -- the effect 
on their audience. In the above example, the Jordanian 
citizens are part of the audience. The fear invoked by such 
an act is not limited to Iraqi citizens. The Jordanians 
also feel fear and intimidation. The effect of the act is 
felt by citizens of another nation, not just the immediate 
victim and perpetrator. Transnational terrorism overcomes 
this difficulty by factoring in the psychological aspect of 
the audience affected at the location of the act. 
"Transnational terrorism" encompasses a more complete 
definition than does "international terrorism". 
Summary 
By clearly defining transnational terrorism a better 
understanding of the nature of the phenomena is achieved. 
Terrorism is not merely criminal activity. Terrorists 
commit their acts with a political objective in mind. 
Terrorism is not a form of warfare. Terrorists break the 
rules of just war by attacking victims. They methodically 
and systematically create an atmosphere of fear in an 
attempt to manipulate the political system from the bottom 




THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
Having defined what is meant by the term 
"transnational terrorism", we can now move on to the heart 
of the matter at hand -- the relationship between terrorism 
and the system. Are certain systems more vulnerable to 
terrorism? The literature spans three topics in the debate 
over the relationship between terrorism and the system: 
open systems and terrorism, closed systems and terrorism, 
and system strength and terrorism. 
Open Systems and Terrorism 
Throughout the literature on terrorism the argument 
is raised that open systems are more vulnerable to 
'terrorism. Wilkinson contends that Western liberal states 
are vulnerable to terrorism due to their tradition of civil 
rights and individual freedom combined with an open media. 1 
This basic argument is proposed by a number of scholars. 2 
1Paul Wilkinson, 
ed. (Washington Square, 
1986), p. 303. 
Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2d 
N.Y.: New York University Press, 
2George P. Shultz, "The Challenge to Democracies," in 
Terrorism: How the West Can Win, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986), 18; Dennis Rowe, 
Considered Responses to Contemporary Terrorism in Democratic 
Societies (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 
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To the basic argument, Bell adds that terrorism is a 
threat to the stability of democratic governments. 3 He 
bases this on the view that democracies are more responsive 
to pressures from citizens. Netanyahu further adds that the 
rule of law in open systems inhibits "a powerful 
response." 4 Terrorism, thus, may pose a threat to the 
stability and security of open systems. 
At face value, the argument is strong: Open systems 
are more vulnerable to terrorists because they are open. 
Open systems provide maximum exposure producing wide-spread 
fear. In open systems, public opinion plays a greater role 
in policy making. Thus, open systems provide the terrorist 
group with maximum opportunity to achieve the goals. This 
The University of Illinois at Chicago, 1988); Ray S. Cline and 
Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: 
Crane Russak, 1984); Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. 
Arnold, "Democracy Under Attack," in Fighting Back: Winning 
the War Against Terrorism, ed. Neil Livingstone and Terrell E. 
Arnold (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986); Frederick 
Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies: Terror and 
Terrorism in Our Times (New York: Norton, 1976); Edward F. 
Mickolus and Edward Heyman, "ITERATE: Monitoring 
Transnational Terrorism," in Behavioral and Quantitative 
Perspectives on Terrorism, ed. Yonah Alexander and John M. 
Gleason (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981); Claire Sterling, 
The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981); For an overview 
of this argument, see Peter C. Sederberg, "Terrorism and 
Democracy," in Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and 
Reality, ed. Peter C. Sederberg (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1989). 
3J. Bower Bell, A Time of Terror: 
Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence 
Books, Inc., 1978), 106. 
How Democratic 
(New York: Basic 
4Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986), 6. 
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argument, of course, assumes that the terrorist is a 
rational individual who attempts to maximize benefits while 
minimizing costs. It also assumes that the transnational 
terrorist can achieve his ultimate political objective 
through an open system and that closed systems can deal with 
terrorism more effectively. 
In response to this widely held view, Dror argues 
that while democracies may be vulnerable to terrorist 
incidents, they are able to successfully handle the adverse 
effects of terrorism. 5 Specifically, Dror argues: 
Few Western democracies have stumbled or faltered 
because of terrorism ... No central policy ... [has been] 
abandoned to accommodate terrorist demands. The ... costs 
and ... inconveniences of protecting targets ... seem 
bearable .... The human costs of terrorism are small. 6 
Further, open systems usually enjoy greater legitimacy, 
further strengthening the system. So, while open systems 
may be vulnerable to a higher number of terrorist incidents, 
the systems themselves are not necessarily vulnerable to the 
destabilizing affects of terrorism. 
Closely tied to the open system vulnerability 
perspective is the international conspiracy perspective. 
This position was particularly widespread during the Cold 
War, but still retains a following in this post-Cold War 
5Yehezkel Dror, "Terrorism as a Challenge to the 
Democratic Capacity to Govern," in Terrorism, Legitimacy and 
Power: The consequences of political violence, ed. Martha 
Crenshaw (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 
1983) . 
6Ibid. I 70-71. 
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era. The conspiracy perspective takes the open system 
vulnerability argument a step further. Not only do the 
proponents of this idea contend that open systems are more 
vulnerable, they also contend that terrorist groups 
particularly target open systems. 
Within this perspective varying degrees exist. 
Authors such as Shultz claim that whenever terrorism occurs 
it attacks democracies by attacking democratic norms and 
principles. 7 Others contend that an international 
terrorist network particularly targets the United States and 
its allies. 8 During the Cold War, some advocates of this 
perspective viewed the Soviet Union as the force behind such 
a network. Today, some of these same advocates view Islamic 
fundamentalism as the force behind the network of terrorism. 
The conspiracy advocates generally give two reasons 
to support their perspective. First, during the Cold War 
some contended that the Soviet Union sponsored and 
controlled international terrorism. To support his claim of 
such sponsorship, Wilkinson points out that terrorist 
organizations used Soviet weapons and the evidence of 
7Shultz, 18. 
8see Netanyahu; Cline and Alexander; Shultz; Becker; 
James Berry Motley, "Target America: The Undeclared War," in 
Fighting Back: Winning the War against Terrorism, eds. Neil 
C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington, Mass. : 
Lexington Books, 1986); Alex Peter Schmid, Political 
Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases 
and Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983); 
Livingstone and Arnold; and Wilkinson. 
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training activities for terrorists within the Soviet Union 
and its allies. 9 Cline and Alexander cited evidence of 
support for terrorist organizations by what they term 
"surrogates" of the Soviet Union, including Bulgaria, Cuba, 
East Germany, and Vietnam. 10 
Others took the Soviet conspiracy notion even further 
charging that the Soviet Union was using terrorism as a form 
of warfare against the West. Livingstone and Arnold 
contended that "World War III has already begun. 1111 
McFarlane asserted that the way to fight terrorism was by 
"persuading the Soviet Union and its allies to stop using 
support for low-level violence as an instrument of warfare 
against the West. " (Italics added) 12 
While evidence exists to support this contention, 
evidence also exists to counter such claims. Sederberg, 
Crenshaw, and Golan offer the strongest such evidence. 
Sederberg and Golan both note that open societies are not 
the only victims of terrorism. 13 Specifically, Golan cites 
9see Wilkinson. 
10c1 ine and Alexander, 6 . 
11 Li vingstone and Arnold, 2- 3. 
12Robert C. McFarlane, "Foreward, 11 in Fighting Back: 
Winning the War Against Terrorism, eds. Neil Livingstone and 
Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), 
p. x. 
13Peter C. Sederberg, "International Terrorist 
Conspiracies," in Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and 
Reality, ed. Peter C. Sederberg (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1989), 110; Galia Golan, Gorbachev' s "New 
the example of Soviet citizens kidnapped in Beirut in 
October 1985. 14 Crenshaw takes a different approach, 
contending that linking financial and logistic support to 
control of actions of groups is difficult to assess. She 
argues that state affiliation does not equal state control 
of a terrorist group. 15 
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The second reason given for a conspiracy perspective 
is the contention that the targets of the conspiracy are the 
democratic societies of the West because of the ideological 
threat they pose to the ideologies of the terrorists. 16 
Advocates of this argument primarily link terrorism with 
left-wing ideologies. 17 Further, they contend that 
Marxist-Leninist ideology justifies terrorism. Cline and 
Alexander assert: 
To a greater and lesser extent, the founders [of 
communism] all advocated employing confrontation tactics 
-- including terrorism -- for achieving Communist 
aims. 18 
To support this assertion, Cline and Alexander cite Marx, 
Thinking" on Terrorism (New York: Praeger, 1990). 
14Golan, 85. 
15crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 
12. 
16see Alexander and Cline; and Netanyahu. 
17Recently, some scholars have shifted their focus to 
right-wing ideologies that are associated with Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
18cline and Alexander, 9-10. 
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Lenin, Trotsky, and Krushchev. 19 They call Soviet 
Communism the "philosophical justification of violence. 1120 
In contrast to this argument, several authors cite 
evidence of a different Soviet attitude towards terrorism. 
Some contend that Marxist-Leninist thought does not justify 
terrorism. Rather, it condemns the use of terrorism by 
individuals. Revolution by classes is the only justified 
violence. 21 Laqueur notes that the Soviet's have presented 
a negative attitude towards terrorism. The Soviets, 
however, made exceptions; they viewed terrorism as 
"legitimate in national liberation movements. 1122 
Others contend that the Soviets have not held a 
consistent ideologically based position on terrorism. 
Crenshaw cites the Soviet responses to the 1985 Achille 
Lauro incident and the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya as 
evidence of a changed attitude. In the Achille Lauro 
incident the Soviets called the U.S. anger "understandable 
and just" and called for the punishment of Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists. In the bombing of Libya, 
the Soviets did not warn Libya of the impending attack and 
they did not give Libya the military assistance they 
19Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 12. 
21wal ter Laqueur, "Foreward, " in Gorbachev' s "New 
Thinking" On Terrorism, by Galia Golan (New York: Praeger, 
1990) f P• viii. 
22 Ibid, p. vii. 
requested. 23 
Golan contends that the Soviet policy towards 
terrorism changed over time becoming less supportive. As 
evidence of the change in Soviet policy towards terrorism, 
Golan cites pressure by the Soviets on terrorist groups to 
seek political settlements beginning in 1986 and a new 
willingness to cooperate to combat terrorism. 24 Such a 
body of evidence countering the contentions of the 
conspiracy perspective cannot be ignored. 
Closed Systems and Terrorism 
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Most of the literature on terrorism supports the 
notion that closed systems are less vulnerable to terrorism 
than are open systems. Closed systems are less vulnerable 
because of the closed nature of the societies. Most closed 
systems employ tight security within the country and closed 
borders. Further, they strictly control the media. 25 As 
Wilkinson notes, closed systems "can ensure that news of any 
attack is suppressed."u Such arguments are closely tied 
to the arguments previously noted in support of open system 
vulnerability to terrorism. 
32-34. 
While a great deal of literature exists to support 
23crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 
24Golan, p. xvi. 
~Sederberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," 162. 
26wilkinson, 104. 
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open system vulnerability to terrorism, some literature 
does exist to support closed system vulnerability to 
terrorism. Such arguments are based on identifying 
"vulnerability" in terms of the political effects, not based 
on the number of incidents. Horowitz presents such a view. 
He contends that terrorism is most damaging to totalitarian 
regimes because of an increased chance of disrupting the 
government process. 27 Closed systems, therefore, attempt 
to decrease this vulnerability to terrorism through their 
control mechanisms. 
Crenshaw asserts that closed systems are vulnerable 
to terrorism since terrorists do sometimes target them. As 
examples, Crenshaw cites the 1985 kidnapping of Soviet 
officials in Beirut and the 1986 hijacking of an Iraqi 
airliner. 28 Golan cites similar examples, as was 
previously noted. As interesting as this argument is, the 
literature seems to support the conclusion that open systems 
experience increased vulnerability to terrorism. 
System Strength and Terrorism 
Having examined the relationship between the system 
type and vulnerability to terrorism, our attention must turn 
27Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Routinization of 
Terrorism and Its Unanticipated Consequences," in Terrorism, 
Legitimacy and Power: The consequences of political violence, 
ed. Martha Crenshaw (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1983), 41. 
28crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 
20. 
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to the relationship between system strength and terrorism. 
Evidence in the literature suggests that system openness may 
not be sufficient to understand system vulnerability. Some 
scholars contend that regardless of system openness, weak 
systems are more vulnerable to terrorism. 29 Dror argues 
that weak democracies are the most vulnerable systems. 30 
Sederberg takes this further arguing that any weak state is 
vulnerable, regardless of system openness. 31 
Crenshaw argues that third world regimes, which are 
frequently weak systems, are more vulnerable to change due 
to terrorism whether they are democratic or 
authoritarian. 32 As evidence, Crenshaw cites a number of 
regimes that fell after spurts of terrorism, including 
Nicaragua, Iran, Uruguay and Argentina. 33 Cline and 
Alexander add to this view of weak system vulnerability 
contending that Americans are most at risk in regions with 
ongoing revolutions. 34 Any system with ongoing revolutions 
is anything but stable and strong. 
Not only does Sederberg argue that weak systems are 
29Wilkinson, 83; See also Dror; Crenshaw, Terrorism and 
International Cooperation. 
30Dror, 71. 
31 sederberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," 162. 
32crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation. 
33 Ibid. 
~Cline and Alexander, 1. 
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vulnerable, he further argues that strong democracies are 
the least vulnerable to terrorism because of their openness, 
rules of law, and representative institutions. These all 
combine to "ensure legitimacy of the state. 1135 This leads 
to isolation of terrorists who then fail to gain public 
support for their political objectives. Crenshaw supports 
such a view, contending that terrorism has not weakened 
established liberal states. 36 This position is in 
contradiction to the open system vulnerability perspective 
previously discussed. 
System vulnerability to terrorism based on type 
narrows down to two basic propositions. Weak systems are 
more vulnerable to the internal political effects of 
terrorism than are strong systems, regardless of system 
openness. Strong, open systems are least vulnerable to the 
internal political effects of terrorism. 
Summary 
The conflicting literature on the relationship 
between the system and vulnerability to terrorism 
demonstrates the necessity of a systematic, empirical study. 
On the one hand, some scholars contend that open systems are 
more vulnerable to transnational terrorism than closed 
systems due to nature of the system. On the other hand, 
21. 
35sederberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," 162. 
36crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 
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scholars argue that closed systems are more vulnerable to 
the effects of terrorism. Still other scholars question 
whether the issue is merely one of system type, suggesting, 
rather, that the system strength is key to understanding the 
vulnerability of a system. Such conflicting views 
necessitate further empirical study. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRORISM AND THE SYSTEM: 
HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS 
To understand transnational terrorism at a system 
level, the relationship between the system and terrorism 
will be examined systematically through quantitative 
research. The literature suggests four general concepts 
necessary for an understanding of such a relationship: the 
type of system, the stability of the system, the strength of 
the system and the level of transnational terrorism. In 
this chapter, these four concepts will be operationalized, 
the research hypotheses will be formed and the method for 
analyzing the relationship will be developed. 
Operationalizing the Concepts 
To analyze the relationship between political 
systems and transnational terrorism, this research project 
requires variables for the incidents of transnational 
terrorism, the system type, the system strength, and the 
system stability. In the process of operationalizing the 
concepts, sources of data must also be identified. 
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Measuring Terrorism 
The terrorism variable will be measured using the 
ITERATE2 data set. 1 The ITERATE2 data set includes 
information on the number of transnational incidents per 
year that began in a given country (INCIDENT). ITERATE2 
includes data from 1968 - 1977 and contains information on 
3,329 incidents of terrorism. 
The ITERATE data sets were created to analyze 
terrorist incidents at a global level. The key name 
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behind the ITERATE projects is Edward Mickolus, a former 
analyst for the CIA. 2 The data sets are based on a content 
analysis of more than 200 separate sources. Of those 200 
sources, seven are key to ITERATE, as follows: AP, UPI, 
Reuter tickers, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the 
Washington Times and the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Services (FBIS) Daily Reports. 3 
1Edward F. Mickolus, International Terrorism: 
Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-1977 (ITERATE2) (Ann 
Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research, 1982) 
2Three ITERATE data sets now exist: ITERATE2 (1968-
1977), ITERATE3 (1978-1987), and ITERATE4 (1988-1993); see 
Walter Enders, Gerald F. Parise and Todd Sandler, "A Time-
Series Analysis of Transnational Terrorism: Trends and 
Cycles," Defence Economics 3 (1992): 305-20; Walter Enders and 
Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: 
A Vector-Autoregression- Intervention Analysis, " American 
Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 829-44. Only 
ITERATE2 is available through the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research. 
3Enders and Sandler, 833. 
40 
The major drawback of data sets, such as ITERATE2, 
is their reliance on publicly reported incidents. This may 
not be a complete source of information, especially in 
closed systems. As Burgess and Lawton note, 
If important aspects ... are not public and do not appear 
in the public press, then the validity of the model can 
be called into question. 4 
Thus, events based data sets can pose significant validity 
problems. Reliance on limited sources of information can 
create a source bias in such data sets threatening the 
validity. 5 Further, research has demonstrated that 
reliance on a single data source is inappropriate. 6 
Both the number of sources and the validity of the 
major sources used by ITERATE2 increase the validity of the 
data set. 7 ITERATE2 is based on over 200 sources of data, 
4Philip M. Burgess and Raymond W. Lawton, "Evaluating 
Events Data: Problems of Conception, Reliability, and 
Validity," in International Events and the Comparative 
Analysis of Foreign Policy, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. , 
Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood and Richard A. Skinner 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), 
111. 
5see Alex Peter Schmid (1983), Political Terrorism: 
A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases and 
Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983); M.D. 
Carpini and B.A. Williams, "Television and Terrorism: 
Patterns of Presentation and Occurrence, 1969-1980," Western 
Political Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1987): 45-64; and Burgess and 
Lawton. 
6J. H. Sigler, "Reliability Problems in the Measurement 
of International Events in the Elite Press," in Applications 
of Events Data Analysis, ed. J.H. Sigler, J.O. Field and M.L. 
Adelman (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972). 
7Using multiple sources increases validity of data. 
See Robert W. Jackman and William A. Boyd, "Multiple Sources 
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including regional data sources. This large number of 
sources reduces the bias that reliance on a single source 
creates. In addition, inclusion of regional sources to 
supplement global sources increases the validity of the data 
set, though it does not eliminate the problem posed by event 
data in a closed system. 
The validity of ITERATE2 is further enhanced by the 
major sources. The New York Times, one of ITERATE's major 
sources has been established as a valid source of global 
information. In a 1971 study, Gamson and Modigliani 
established the validity of the New York Times as a global 
source by comparing it to regional sources in India. They 
found that the New York Times recorded 97% of all events 
recorded by the regional sources.a In other research, 
Burrowes, Muzzio, and Spector found that for events in the 
Middle East, the New York Times yields one of the highest 
percentages of events reported. 9 
in the Collection of Data on Political 
Journal of Political Science 23 (1979) : 
Schmid; and Burgess and Lawton. 
Conflict," American 
434-58; see also 
aw.A. Gamson and A. Modigliani, Untangling the Cold 
War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1971). 
9Richard Burrowes, D. Muzzio and B. Spector, "Mirror, 
Mirror on the Wall ... : a source comparison study of 
internation events data," in Comparing Foreign Policies, ed. 
James N. Rosenau (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974). 
In other research, Sophia Peterson, "A Case-Study of 3rd-World 
News Coverage by the Western News Agencies and the Times, " 
Studies in Comparative International Development 15, no. 2 
(1980): 62-98, found that Western news agencies tend to 
underreport Third World events; while Burgess and Lawton found 
In contrast, other scholars have called into 
question the validity of the newspaper as the basis for 
international events data sets. 10 To counteract problems 
associated with reliance on the New York Times, ITERATE2 
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relies on other strong sources, including Reuter's and FBIS 
Daily Reports. Indeed, the FBIS "draws from hundreds of 
world print and electronic media resources and is the best 
single source of material on foreign coverage. 1111 
Other scholars view ITERATE itself as a strong data 
set that is based on methodologically sound techniques. 
Carpini and Williams state, "it [ITERATE] provides as 
accurate a view of the actual patterns of international 
terrorism as is available today. 1112 Through its use of 
both local and regional sources, ITERATE2 employs the sound 
techniques to counteracts the U.S. bias. 13 
that they tend to over-report "English-language sources". See 
also M.D. Carpini and B.A. Williams, "Television and 
Terrorism: Patterns of Presentation and Occurrence, 1969-
1980," Western Political Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1987): 45-64. 
10Peterson, 62-98; R.F. 
Foreign News: A Comparison of 
Indian White Papers, " Journal 
(1969): 23-26. 
Smith, "On the Structure of 
the New York Times and the 
of Peace Research 6, no. 1 
11wal ter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness 
of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-
Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review 87, 
no. 4 ( 19 9 3) : 8 3 3 . 
12carpini and Williams, 51. 
13see Carpini and Williams. 
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Through reliance on numerous global sources 
supplemented with numerous regional sources, ITERATE reduces 
validity problems. All of the potential problems are not 
eliminated, for the data set is still only based on reported 
events, but it does decrease the amount of error due to poor 
data collecting techniques. Use of the ITERATE data sets as 
the source of data on terrorism will provide the best source 
available and, thus, provide a strong basis for obtaining 
the most valid results possible. 
Measuring the System 
Data on system type, system strength and system 
stability will come from Gastil's Comparative Survey of 
Freedom (1973-1978) . 14 The Comparative Survey was first 
compiled in 1972 and has been compiled annually since. 
The Comparative Survey of Freedom is not a events 
data set in the same sense as is ITERATE2. The Comparative 
Survey of Freedom was developed in an attempt to "give the 
public a tool to place international events in 
perspective. 1115 Specifically, the developers of the survey 
wanted to provide a means to analyze the level political 
14Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of 
Freedom," Freedom at Issue, 18 (1973): 4; idem, "The 
Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 23 (1974): 
8; idem, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 
29 (1975): 5; idem, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," 
Freedom at Issue 34 ( 1976) : 15; idem, "The Comparative 
Survey of Freedom, " Freedom at Issue 3 9 ( 1977) 9; idem, 
Freedom in the World, 1978 (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1978). 
15Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 4. 
freedom of a system apart from the fluctuations of the 
media. Gastil himself emphasizes that the survey was 
designed primarily to be a comparative tool facilitating 
analysis of the relative freedom levels. 16 
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In the Comparative Survey, Gastil measures the level 
of political rights (PR) and civil rights (CR) . He defines 
political rights as "legal rights to play a part in 
determining who governs or what the laws of the community 
are. 1117 In judging the level of political rights, Gastil 
focuses on the behavior of individuals and governments 
during and following elections. For example, he examines 
the such elements as extent of competition in elections, the 
level of replacement of leaders, and the participatory 
levels. Gastil differs here from others who have measured 
freedom or democracy. He does not simply count any 
participation as an indication of political rights, but 
rather his emphasis is on "rights to participate 
meaningfully in the political process. 1118 
However useful a measure of political rights may be, 
political rights alone does not sufficiently measure 
freedom. For political rights to be meaningful individuals 
16Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89, 7. 
17Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 7. 
18Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89 (New 
York: Freedom House, 1989) t 7. 
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must also possess civil rights. Gastil defines civil rights 
as: 
... rights of the individual against the state, 
rights to free expression, to a fair trial; they are 
what most of us mean by freedom. 19 
As with political rights, Gastil focuses on behavior 
patterns. 
Gastil contends that a subjective tool such as 
employed in the measure of civil rights is necessary. 
Merely counting the human rights violations can be 
misleading. A single case of a rights violation may be more 
critical in a small country than in a large country. 
Further, counting incidents does not measure the behavior. 
Finally, Gastil argues, a subjective measure of civil rights 
is necessary to balance the good behavior against the bad 
rather than merely focusing on the bad. 20 
To compare nations at this level, Gastil utilizes a 
variety of sources including the annual editions of the 
Political Handbook of the World and the Worldmark 
Encyclopedia of Nations. These two main sources are 
supplemented by press reports, background investigations, 
and articles from journals such as Foreign Affairs and the 
Middle East Journal. 21 The information from these sources 
19Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 7. 
20Raymond Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89 
York: Freedom House, 1989). 
(New 
21 For more information on sources of information, see 
Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 9. 
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is analyzed by Gastil with a standard questionnaire that is 
applied to all nations. The information recorded on the 
questionnaire is then used to determine both the level of 
political rights and civil rights in a nation. 
Gastil's Comparative Survey of Freedom has not been 
without critics. Criticism of this work has been raised at 
two levels. Ideologically, the Comparative Survey has been 
criticized as having a bias due to the close affiliation 
with Freedom House. Interestingly it has been criticized as 
having a conservative bias and a liberal bias22 • In 
contrast, Mccamant contends that "· .. the scoring does not 
have any obvious geographical or ideological bias. 1123 In 
response to the criticisms, Gastil contends that such 
critics select pieces of information that fit their 
particular argument without looking at the whole context. 
Further, he contends that sponsorship of the survey by 
22Hartman and Hsiao (1988), p. 797; John D. Nagle, 
Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Systems and 
Performance in Three Worlds (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1985); Adda 
Bozemann, review of Freedom in the World: Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties, 1978 by Raymond D. Gastil, Orbis 23 
(1979): 213-20; Richard F. Feen, review of Freedom in the 
World: Political and Civil Liberties, 1984 - 1985 by Raymond 
Gastil and Country Reports on the Human Rights Practices for 
1984 by the U.S. Department of State." Washington Quarterly 
8 (1985) : 237-41. 
23John F. Mccamant, "A Critique of Present Measures of 
'Human Rights Development' and an Alternative, " in Global 
Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO 
Strategies, ed. Ved P. Nanda, James R. Scarritt and George W. 
Shepherd, Jr. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), 132. 
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Freedom House does not equal control. 24 
Methodologically, Gastil has been criticized for 
using subjective measures. Specifically, Mccamant contends 
that due to Gastil's vagueness in operationalization, the 
Comparative Survey measures cannot be evaluated for 
reliability or validity. 25 Having said that, Mccamant goes 
on to say: 
Though the reproducibility of the scores is nil, the 
margin of error may not be too large. The data 
might be good enough to make crude correlations on a 
1 1 26 arge samp e ... 
How can Mccamant claim that the "margin of error may not be 
too large" if he is unable to evaluate the data? 
In response to questions regarding the validity of 
measures of democracy in general, Bollen conducts a series 
of tests on a number of such measures including Gastil's 
Comparative Survey. He finds that Gastil's political rights 
have the highest overall validity. 27 Further supporting 
the validity of Gastil's measures is research conducted by 
Banks in which he finds that Gastil's civil rights measures 
correlate well with the objective human measures developed 
24Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89, 79-80. 
25McCamant, 13 0. 
26McCamant, 132. 
27Kenneth Bollen, "Liberal Democracy -- Validity and 
Method Factors in Cross-National Measures," American Journal 
of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1993): 1219-1220. 
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separately by Charles Humana. 28 Further, as Bollen argues, 
the subjective measures carry an advantage over objective 
measures because "they can gauge key traits of liberal 
democracy that escape detection."~ Thus, research 
demonstrates that although Gastil uses a subjective measure, 
his results have a strong degree of validity. In addition, 
the Comparative Survey provide the time-series measure 
necessary to establish the relationship between the system 
and transnational terrorism. This being the case, the 
Comparative Survey provides a strong foundation for 
operationalizing the variables of system type, system 
strength, and system stability. 
The system type will be measured using Gastil's 
measures of political rights (PR) and civil rights (CR) . 
To operationalize the measurement of political rights and 
civil rights, Gastil uses a scale ranging from 1 to 7. To 
calculate the score, Gastil employs a four step method, as 
follows: 
1) comparison of civil liberties, 2) comparison of 
political liberties, 3) balancing of these to 
establish the relative status of freedom, 4) 
establishing current trends in freedom. 30 
28David L. Banks, "Patterns of Oppression: A 
Statistical Analysis of Human Rights," Proceedings of the 
Social Statistics Section of the American Statistical 
Association, 1985; see also Charles Humana, World Human Rights 
Guide, (London: Hutchinson, 1983). 
29Bollen, 1210. 
30Raymond D. Gastil, 
Freedom at Issue 17 (1973): 
"The New Criteria of Freedom," 
20. 
To receive a ranking of 1 in political rights, a political 
system must exhibit both the right and the opportunity for 
widespread participation in the electoral process, both in 
terms of voting and running for office. 31 Thus, the most 
open systems have scores of 1. Tyrannies -- the most 
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closed systems -- receive a ranking of 7 in political 
rights. 32 Systems which hold elections but experience 
"coups, massive interference with results, or other non-
democratic procedures" sit at the midpoint of the political 
rights rankings.n 
Civil rights are calculated following a similar 
pattern. Political systems receive a score of 1 if "freedom 
of expression is both possible and evident" and the "rule of 
law is unshaken. "34 These are the systems which are most 
open. In contrast, political systems receive a ranking of 7 
in civil rights if criticism is rarely heard and if citizens 
have no rights. These are the most closed systems. Systems 
that provide some individual liberties, but such liberties 
are frequently suppressed or broad areas exists where free 
expression is illegal lie at the midpoint of the civil 




34 Ibid, 21. 
35 Ibid. 
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Surveys provide a measure of the openness of the system, 
with the most open systems receiving a ranking of 1 in both 
political rights (PR) and civil rights (CR) . 
The political rights and civil rights measures have 
been found to have a great deal of collinearity, but, as 
Gastil argues, they are interdependent. 36 Therefore, to 
reduce problems of collinearity these two measures will be 
added together to build an overall score of openness (FREE) 
ranging from 2 to 14 with 2 being the most open and 14 being 
the most closed system. 
System strength (STRENGTH) will be derived from 
Gastil's measures of political rights (PR) and civil rights 
(CR) . The strong systems are classified as those systems at 
either extreme of the FREE scale (2 or 14) while the weaker 
systems are those in the middle. Gastil contends that those 
systems to which he gives a score of 3 are plagued by either 
"extreme threats to the state or unresolvable political 
deadlock" and, further, though there are elections for 
representatives, those elections are constantly being 
challenged. 37 These systems are struggling to maintain 
36Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of 
Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions, " in On Measuring 
Democracy, ed. Alex Inkeles (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction 
Publishers, 1991), 24; David L. Banks, "The Analysis of Human 
Rights Data Over Time." Human Rights Quarterly 8, no. 4 
(1986): 654-80; see also R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and 
International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, 
no . 1 ( 19 8 3 ) : 2 7 - 71 . 
~Gastil, "New Criteria for Freedom," 20-21. 
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legitimacy and order; these are the weak political systems. 
Further, examination of the classification of 
systems at the extremes (2 or 14) gives credence to 
utilizing the scores to measure system strength. 38 A 
political system with a political rights score of 7 and a 
civil rights score of 7 is governed through tyranny and 
complete suppression of individual rights. At the other 
extreme, a political system with a political rights score of 
1 and a civil rights score of 1 is governed through popular 
participation and widespread individual rights. In either 
case, the legitimacy of the system is not under attack. 
Further, the systems perform their order-maintaining 
functions. 
System strength (STRENGTH) will be classified as 
follows: (1) Very strong systems are those which have a 
FREE score of either 2 or 14; (2) Moderately strong systems 
have a FREE score of either 3 or 13; (3) Somewhat strong 
systems have a free score of either 4 or 12; (4) Somewhat 
weak systems have a FREE score of either 5 or 11; (5) 
moderately weak systems have a FREE score of either 6 or 10; 
and (6) very weak systems have a FREE score of either 7, 8, 
or 9. Thus, by manipulating these scores, the system 
strength can be measured. 
Finally, the political effects of terrorism on the 
stability of a system (STABLE) will also be measured using 
~Ibid. 
Gastil's measures. The literature suggests that systems 
become more closed over time as a result of terrorism. 
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These political effects can be measure by analyzing the 
difference between the freedom scores of a particular nation 
from year to year. Systems which increase their combined 
score over time are becoming relatively more closed. 
Systems which decrease their score over time are those which 
are becoming relatively more open. Gastil's scores, then, 
will differ over time for unstable systems. For example, a 
system might receive a combined score of 7 in 1973 and a 
combined score of 12 in 1974. Such a dramatic change in the 
system demonstrates that the system has been dramatically 
altered in some way. In contrast, a movement from 2 to 1 
may not demonstrate instability in the system. Overall, 
however, instability should be reflected in changes in 
Gastil's scores over time. 
The empirical data discussed above will be utilized 
to test the research hypotheses over the period of 1972 
through 1977. 1972 is the first year for which the 
Comparative Survey of Freedom is available while 1977 is the 
last year in ITERATE2. Further, a six year span should 
provide a good sample for making generalizations about the 
relationship in question. 
Thus, two sets of data will be used to 
operationalize the proposed hypotheses: the ITERATE data 
set and Gastil's Freedom in the World measures. Both of 
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these sources of data have been found to be relatively good 
sources of data, both in terms of validity and reliability. 
They also both provide the necessary time-series data for 
operationalizing the stability variable. These two sources 
are the best available to examine the proposed research. 
The Hypotheses 
The literature underpins the three hypotheses to be 
analyzed. First, the literature suggests that open systems 
are more vulnerable to terrorism than closed systems. 
Vulnerability can be assessed in terms of number of 
incidents. The more transnational terrorist events which 
target citizens of open systems, the more vulnerable such 
systems are. 
A lower Freedom House score (FREE) is 
directly related to the number of 
transnational terrorist incidents (INCIDENT) 
Second, we expect to find that increased political 
instability will result from increased terrorist activity. 
~: An increase in the Freedom House score from 
time1 to time2 (STABLE) is positively related 
to the number of transnational terrorist 
incidents (INCIDENT) at time 1 • 
Not only does the literature suggest a relationship 
between system type and terrorism, it also suggests a 
relationship between system strength and terrorism. 
Hypothesis 3 addresses this. 
~: System strength (STRENGTH) is negatively 
related to the incidents of transnational 
terrorism (INCIDENT). 
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These first three hypotheses relate to the bivariate 
relationships. The final hypothesis draws these three 
components together into a system-level explanation for 
terrorism. 
~: System type (FREE) , system strength 
(STRENGTH) and system stability (STABLE) are 
related to incidents of transnational 
terrorism (INCIDENT). 
These research hypotheses, then, attempt to 
determine the relationship between terrorism and the system. 
They take into account the system variables of system type -
- open v. closed system strength -- weak v. strong -- and 
system stability stable v. unstable. These hypotheses 
should lead to a better understanding of the relationship 
between the system and terrorism. 
Summary 
Empirical research requires that concepts be 
operationalized and that research hypotheses be established. 
This chapter has specified how the key concepts -- system 
type, system strength, system stability and transnational 
terrorism -- will be operationalized. The hypotheses 
relationships between these concepts have also been 
established. The relationship between systems and 
transnational terrorism remains to be analyzed. This will 
be accomplished in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA ANALYSIS: 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRORISM AND THE SYSTEM 
Analysis of the research hypotheses was conducted in 
two steps and will be presented in that order. The first 
level of analysis involved separate bivariate analysis 
between the three independent variables -- FREE, STRENGTH, 
STABLE -- and the dependent variable, INCIDENT. The second 
level of analysis involved multivariate analysis of the 
variables. A summary of the results follows. 
Bivariate Analysis 
Bivariate analysis is accomplished through two 
techniques: regression and correlation. These two 
statistical tools allow analysis of the strength and the 
direction of the relationships between the variables. The 
results of the bivariate analysis will thus be used to begin 
to develop an understanding of the relationship between the 
political system and transnational terrorism. 
INCIDENT with FREE 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that a direct relationship 
exists between the system type (FREE) and the number of 
transnational terrorism incidents (INCIDENT). Thus, we 
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expected to find that systems with lower FREE scores would 
see higher incidents of terrorism. The results indicate 
that such a relationship exists, but the strength of the 
relationship is not as high as the literature suggests. 
Indeed, the results show an r of -.29 and an r 2 of .08. 1 
While this indicates an important relationship, it does not 
indicate a strong relationship. Indeed, given the likely 
pro-open system bias in the data, the relationship is likely 
to be less than that exhibited here. 
The plot of the data proves insightful into this 
apparent anomaly (see figure 2) . What is quickly obvious 
from that plot is that both open and closed systems have 
cases with no terrorism or low levels of terrorism. This 
cumulation of zeros and ones pulls the overall regression 
line down. Further examination reveals that the highest 
incidents of terrorism are found in the open systems. Thus, 
this plot indicates that openness is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for transnational terrorism incidents. 
To further examine the hypothesized relationship, a 
regression and correlation between the system type and the 
number of transnational terrorist incidents was analyzed on 
a year by year basis (see figure 3). Specifically, this was 
an attempt to analyze if the relationship changed over time 
or if a particularly high year skewed the results. 
1n=917; Significance=.00. 
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917 cases plotted. Regression statistics of INCIDENT on FREE: 
Correlation -.28678 R Squared .08224 S.E. of Est 8.07397 2-tailed Sig. .0000 
InterceptCS.E.) 7.81566( .64327) Slope(S.E.) -.60019( .06628) 




Year Correlation R Squared Significance 
1972 -.26 .07 .00 
1973 -.26 .07 .00 
1974 -.30 .09 .00 
1975 -.28 .07 .00 
1976 -.32 .10 .00 
1977 -.35 .12 .00 
Figure 3. -- Regression of INCIDENT with FREE by YEAR 
The data suggests that the relationship did change 
slightly over the years. Between 1972 and 1977 the 
correlation increased from -.26 to -.35 while the r 2 increased 
from .07 to .12. While the results may indicate a slight 
trend towards an increased relationship between system type 
and terrorist incident, overall they indicated continuity and 
consistency especially given validity and reliability problems 
with the data. In sum, the data mildly supports the 
assertions that open systems are more vulnerable to 
transnational terrorism. 
INCIDENT With STRENGTH 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that as a system becomes 
stronger, it sees fewer incidents of transnational 
terrorism. The results indicate that this is not the case. 
Indeed, as a system becomes stronger (closer to 1) , it 
becomes more vulnerable to terrorist incidents. However, 
the relationship is weak at best. Based on 917 cases, the 
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results show an r of -.09 and an r 2 of .01 (see figure 4). 
However, as with the first hypothesis, the high number of 
zero's and one's pulls the regression line down. Though the 
results are statistically significant, the relationship does 
not appear to provide much by way of explaining the level of 
terrorist incidents in a political system. 
Further analysis reveals some rather interesting 
results. Initial examination of the first plot raised the 
question: Is there any difference between the relationship 
strength and incidents in open systems and that same 
relationship in closed systems? To answer this question the 
bivariate relationship between STRENGTH and INCIDENT was 
examined separately by open systems (FREE less than or equal 
to 7) and by closed systems (FREE greater than 7) . The 
results are quite interesting. 
The relationship between INCIDENT and STRENGTH in 
open systems is a negative relationship, similar to that 
found overall (see figure 5). That is, as system strength 
approaches 1, transnational terrorism incidents increase. 
In contrast, the relationship between INCIDENT and STRENGTH 
for closed systems indicates that as system strength 
approaches 1, transnational terrorism decreases (see figure 
6). In both cases the relationship is weak. Further, the 
case of open systems lacks significance. 
Even so, such findings raise interesting questions. 
Among open systems, why are the strongest systems most 
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vulnerable to terrorism? These are precisely the systems 
that should see lower incidents of terrorism. Among closed 
systems, why are the weakest systems most vulnerable to 
terrorism? The answer may lie in other variables not 
examined in this study. 
INCIDENT With STABLE 
The third hypothesis suggests that the stability of 
a system is negatively related to incidents of terrorism. 
As terrorism increases, we expect the stability of the 
system to decrease. Thus, systems are destabilized 
following incidents of terrorism. However, a system that 
experiences a terrorist attack at time1 will not see the 
effects on the system until time2 • Time lags, then must be 
used to examine this relationship. 
Since Gastil's measures are annual increments, years 
had to be employed in the time lags. Of all the 
combinations tried, the two year lag showed the most 
statistically significant results and even they were not 
significant (sig.=.41). Tests of this hypothesis employed 
only 585 cases due to emerging new countries during this 
period. Further, the number of years available for analysis 
is reduced by the lag itself. When a time lag of two years 
is employed, the number of years available to examine is 
reduced to four combinations, as figure 7 demonstrates. 
Overall, the test resulted in an r of .03 and r 2 of 
.001. The plot indicates that the relationship between 
64 





Figure 7. Correspondence of STABLE year with INCIDENT year 
for a two year lag. 
stability and terrorist incidents is not linear (see figure 
8). Indeed, the plot suggests that terrorist events do not 
have a destabilizing effect on the systems in which they 
occur. Rather, systems with high incidents of terrorism 
frequently are the most stable systems. 
This may be due in part to the manner in which 
stability is operationalized. For systems that have a FREE 
level of 7, according to the description provided by Gastil 
tend to be unstable regardless of whether they move up or 
down the scale. These are the systems that freqently lack 
legitimacy and cannot maintain order. 2 Further, only a 
move towards the middle is a destabilizing change. Movement 
towards either extreme solidifies the system. Finally, 
Gastil himself emphasizes that these are relative and not 
absolute measures; they are comparisons between systems in a 
2Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of 
Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions, " in On Measuring 
Democracy, ed. Alex Inkeles (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction 
Publishers, 1991). 
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given year. 3 Thus a change up or down may not signify a 
change in the specific system, but rather signifies a change 
in the relative status compared to other systems. 
Multivariate Analysis: Explanatory value of the Model 
Hypothesis 4 indicates that three variables, system 
type, system strength, and system stability, explain the 
number of transnational terrorist incidents in a political 
system. To test this hypothesis, multiple regression was 
employed. The results are summarized in figure 9. 
Multiple R 
R Squared 




Variable B SE B 
STRENGTH -.36 .22 
STABLE -.05 .25 



















Figure 9. -- Multiple Regression results of FREE, STRENGTH, 
STABLE and INCIDENT (n = 585) 
Overall the hypothesized system level explanation for 
terrorist incidents explains less than 10% of the variance. 
3Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89, 
(New York: Freedom House, 1989). 
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Indeed, the only relationship which appears to contribute 
significantly to the explanation is FREE. While explaining 
7% of a heretofore untested phenomena is noteworthy, it 
certainly is less than was thought to exist based on the 
literature. 
Because of the overall weakness of the STABLE variable, 
a second regression was computed using only STRENGTH and 








Variable B SE B 
STRENGTH -.42 .16 

















Figure 10. -- Multiple Regression results of FREE, STRENGTH, 
and INCIDENT (n = 917) 
These findings indicate a slightly stronger relationship 
with both variables statistically significant. The overall 
picture, however, remains the same. The model does not 
explain much of the variance in either case. 
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Summary 
Overall, the findings were a little disappointing. At 
the bivariate level, transnational terrorism and system 
openness are clearly related, but not as strongly as 
expected. System strength and transnational terrorism are 
only weakly related, with little to establish whether the 
overall direction of the relationship. System stability and 
transnational terrorism show no significant relationship. 
This could be the result of not operationalizing the 
variable correctly. 
At the multivariate level, less than 10% of the 
variance in incidents can be accounted for by the three 
system level variables. Indeed, only the system type (FREE) 
contributes substantially to the resulting relationship. In 
both levels of analysis, the system type (FREE) proved to be 
the strongest variable. 
The question then remains, "What does this all mean?" 
This question will be examined in the next chapter and will 
no doubt raise more questions than it answers. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this project, an understanding 
of the relationship between the system and transnational 
terrorism was pursued. Specifically, this research sought 
to identify system qualities that lend themselves to 
terrorists activity. The literature suggested three system 
level variables that were thought to contribute the problem. 
The relationships have been tested and the results 
summarized. The system level variables analyzed in this 
research do not substantially contribute to an overall 
explanation of the phenomena of transnational terrorism. 
This result, however, does not mean that the research was in 
vain. This research has important implications for future 
research on terrorism. 
The first set of implications relate specifically to 
the system level variables: system type, system strength, 
and system stability. The findings on system type indicate 
that too much emphasis has been placed on this variable. 
This emphasis was, no doubt, fueled by the ideological 
battles of the Cold War. This research demonstrates that 
the strong relationship assumed to exist did not exist, even 
during the Cold War period. Further, considering that media 
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control in closed systems is high, the data may 
underestimate the level of terrorism in closed system. If 
such is the case, then the observed relationship becomes 
more suspect. 
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The findings on system strength indicate that this 
variable is not a key factor. The relationship is extremely 
weak. Further, analysis which distinguishes between open 
and closed systems indicates that the direction of the 
relationship is different depending on the system's 
openness. This could be in part due to a bias in data used 
in this research. Even the best events data is skewed by 
the reporting of information. Future research should seek 
another angle from which to probe this relationship. 
Finally, the findings on system stability 
demonstrate the problems of operationalizing this variable -
- a problem that plagues social scientists at large. Future 
research needs to re-examine the relationship between 
terrorism and the system by finding another way to 
operationalize stability. Further, other variables that 
contribute to instability should be controlled for in future 
research. Additional research should also compare the 
effect of transnational terrorism with the affect of 
internal terrorism; for transnational terrorism may not 
destabilize systems. 
Not only does the research have implications that 
relate directly to the system level variables, it also has 
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implications for terrorist research at large. First and 
foremost this research emphasizes the need for more 
research. Researchers need to look at other variables that 
might have been confused for "system type." Such geo-
strategic elements as ease of entrance (immigration 
policies), available distribution channels, and local 
support structures should be examined empirically. 
Second, terrorist research in general needs to be 
more rigorous. Why has the assumption that system type 
increases vulnerability to terrorism not been examined in 
such a manner before? The assumption can be traced back 
over twenty years. The data used in this research has been 
available for fifteen years. Scholars assumed that system 
type mattered because it seemed intuitively obvious. As 
noted in the introduction, face validity and assumptions, 
are not sufficient, even if based on sound reasoning, when a 
quantitative study is possible. 
Terrorism continues even today. Research on 
terrorism matters. Researchers must strive to increase the 
understanding of the phenomena. The need cannot be more 
urgent. The international community must find a means of 
minimizing the threats posed by terrorist organizations. 
The real urgency of this research lies at a level of ten 
forgotten by researchers: people's lives are at stake. 
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